It has been more than three years since the first countries began implementing ‘graduated responses’, requiring ISPs to take a range of measures to police their users’ copyright infringements. Graduated responses now exist in a range of forms in seven jurisdictions. Right-holders describe them as ‘successful’ and ‘effective’ and are agitating for their further international roll-out. But what is the evidence in support of these claims?
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[There] is little to no evidence that graduated responses are either ‘successful’ or ‘effective’. The analysis casts into doubt the case for their future international roll-out and suggests that existing schemes should be reconsidered.

Abstract:

The music industry has struggled during the past decade due to file sharing and movie business executives fear the same fate. This paper seeks to provide measurements of the effects of peer-to-peer file sharing on the movie industry. We use a long panel of data at the country level containing information on theatrical, video rental, and video retail movie commercial performances, as well as Internet and broadband penetration. We compare the impacts of increased high-speed online connectedness replacing slow-speed Internet connectedness before and after the introduction of the second-generation file sharing technology that has made movie file sharing feasible. This empirical strategy allows us to isolate the effects of file sharing from any other possible Internet impacts on the commercial performance of movies unrelated to file sharing. Our results indicate that the effect of peer-to-peer file sharing is negative and large on video sales, but we do not have confidence regarding the impacts of file sharing on either the theatrical commercial performance of movies or video rentals.

…the infectious idea of internalising externalities turns its victims into grasping, would-be rentiers. You translate a document because you need it in two languages. I come along and use those translations to teach a computer something about context. You tell me I owe you a slice of all the revenue my software generates. That’s just crazy. It’s like saying that someone who figures out how to recycle the rubbish you set out at the kerb should give you a piece of their earnings.
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If every shred needs to be accounted for and paid for, then the harvest won’t happen. Paying for every link you make, or every link you count, or every document you analyse is a losing game. Forget payment: the process of figuring out who to pay and how much is owed would totally swamp the expected return from whatever it is you’re planning on making out of all those unloved scraps.

It would be easy to nitpick at the way Doctorow uses concepts like externality rather freely, but that would miss the point of the essay. Underneath those semantics I think there’s a big idea he’s trying to get at, which isn’t really about externalities at all: it is the complaint that things previously available for free are now priced. It is about the intrusion of money into a creative community.

Think back to Dan Ariely’s discussion of social and market norms. The idea is that we act differently in situations where we perceive as market situations, relative to social situations. In particular, we are less generous towards others and less likely to feel guilty about our breaches of social etiquette when we’re in a market situation. Importantly, once a market norm is introduced into a situation it can destroy the social norms very quickly. Social norms are all about trust and once people feel taken advantage of that trust breaks down and turns into a feeling of betrayal. For example, people may enjoy sharing on Facebook but, once they feel that Facebook is trying to take advantage of their personal information for monetary gain, they feel betrayed and no longer trust it. Social and market norms don’t mix well.*

What Doctorow has identified is a social norm of generosity without expectations that previously pervaded web communities. There are companies, such as Instagram, who took advantage of that to build up a large stock of specific investment and then attempted to monetize it. Whereas we expect our bank to try taking advantage of us (market norm), we feel personally offended if Instagram attempts it (social norm). Consequently, there was a huge outcry about Instagram’s attempted change in their ToS, and that loss of trust could damage the firm permanently.

As attempts to monetize online activities continue it is likely that these conflicts between profit motives and social norms will become more common. Companies recognise how valuable it can be to create social norms in their interaction with users. However, that generates tensions with their quest for profits, which can ultimately end up destroying the social goodwill that is the backbone of their success.

* It occurs to me that this may not hold for economists who are trained to think of everything as a market. Perhaps they will just have to believe the experimental work on the matter rather than looking to their intuition!

Apple has been granted a preliminary injunction banning sales of the Samsung Galaxy Nexus smartphone in the United States… just two days after a similar injunction banning sales of Samsung’s Galaxy Tab 10.1 tablet.

A large contribution to the academic literature on technology patents has been made by Bessen and Hunt. On the subject of companies with large patent portfolios they say:

[E]xtensive competition in patents, rather than inventions, may occur if firms rely on similar technologies and the cost of assembling large portfolios is not very high. In such an environment, firms may compete to tax each others’ inventions—for example, by demanding royalties—and, in the process, reduce their competitors’ incentive to engage in R&D.

The outcome of patent litigation and licensing agreements often depends on the size of the firm’s patent portfolio. This creates an incentive for firms to build larger patent portfolios, especially when their rivals focus on patents as a competitive strategy. Economists sometimes describe this type of environment as a prisoner’s dilemma. All firms would be better off if they did not act in this way, but each firm would be worse off if it did not respond to a surge in patenting by their rivals. Under these circumstances, firms may find themselves competing in court, rather than in the marketplace.

It seems that has come to pass even for companies that are considered among the most innovative.

Well the incentives for trade protectionism is a prisoner’s dilemma.

As Peter Jackson says, if Australia starts subsidising movies we need to do the same or we will miss out on productions – as a result our best response to their protectionism is more protectionism.  Furthermore, if we start subsidising and Australia doesn’t then we get a relatively larger share of the movie industry – assume that this occurs to the point where the tax revenue from the movies exceeds the cost of the subsidies.  In this case our best response is to ALWAYS subsidise.

However, there are two issues.  Firstly it is in Australia’s interest to subsidise (it is also their “dominant strategy”).  And secondly, the decision to subsidise pays off because it hurts Australia.  In the end both countries end up subsidising movies, and both sets of taxpayers end up worse off than in the case when neither country subsidises.

This is the issue, not only with the subsidies on movies, but on all trade protectionism.  That is why we need international co-operation to avoid this type of beggar thy neighbour behaviour.

If I could only buy textbooks in entire units then I probably wouldn’t be willing to purchase the ones which only had a small chapter of interest to me. I miss out on reading the chapter and the publisher misses out on selling me that information. By allowing me to purchase a smaller quantum of information their profit goes up and so does my happiness. It’s surplus increasing to sell me the book in smaller chunks and better for everyone.

Google Books: daily decreases of deadweight loss.

Now, it was pointed out to me that an open source alternative, “Open Office” is compatible with MS Office, and has most all of the same functionality. There would have to be some retraining, however, to ensure that everyone could use it correctly.

It was put to me that my organisation could save quite substantial sums (even after the cost of retraining for its use) from changing to this alternative, and that there would be very few costs to the change.

I searched for reasons why this person was wrong:

• We work collaboratively with a lot of other organisations, and need to be using the same software. But apparently they are completely compatible.
• The support that microsoft offers means it is much safer to use MS office. I can’t recall the response, but apparently this isn’t a big deal.
• People just won’t retrain and will insist on using MS Office because it is what we know. My friend scoffed with contempt.

Why do we all pay so much to use Microsoft intellectual property? I have my suspicions why, but would like to hear from others.

Rather than patent it or make it public, a firm may choose to simply keep the information private as a trade secret. It can then be licenced to a vendor in return for royalties. Unfortunately, this is less efficient than patents because the vendor will under-invest in development of the technology. Essentially this is because the vendor bears the whole cost of further development but is forced to pay a portion of the revenue generated from that investment to the original inventor in the form of royalties. The authors claim that decreasing patent protections could thus cause more inventions to be kept secret and inefficiently licenced, which reduces total welfare.

As a consequence is that the number of ideas available to firms to develop is probably a concave function of the level of patent protection, with an interior maximum! With no patent protections ideas are kept as trade secrets and handed out under exclusive licences. With full patent protection it is too costly to licence the patent and develop the idea. In both cases the level of innovation will be low. Somewhere in between is the ideal level of intellectual property rights enforcement. So even if innovation is sequential, reducing patent protections has the potential to stifle further invention, although not for the reasons usually cited.

NB. Besson and Maskin’s paper isn’t directly comparable with the Vox paper: the former use complementarities to drive their result while the latter exclude such complementarities and allow for private information. Bhattacharya and Guriev are therefore considering a more general problem than B & M, which is why I describe reliance on the B & M result as misleading: it doesn’t represent the vast majority of industries in which patents are used.