Sex offender registration

Keeping up the theme of interesting empirical results as I catch up on my journal reading, here’s some research out of the US on the effect of maintaining a register of sex offenders and notifying the community where they reside.

Sex offenders have become the targets of some of the most far-reaching and novel crime legislation in the U.S. Two key innovations in recent decades have been registration and notification laws which, respectively, require that convicted sex offenders provide valid contact information to law enforcement authorities, and that information about sex offenders be made public. …We find evidence that registration reduces the frequency of sex offenses by providing law enforcement with information on local sex offenders. As we predict using a simple model of criminal behavior, this decrease in crime is concentrated among “local” victims (e.g., friends, acquaintances, neighbors) with no evidence of less crime occurring against strangers. We also find evidence that notification has reduced crime, but not, as legislators anticipated, by disrupting the criminal conduct of convicted sex offenders. Our results instead suggest that notification deters nonregistered sex offenders, and may, in fact, increase recidivism among registered offenders by reducing the relative attractiveness of a crime-free life.

So notifying the community, probably the most controversial aspect of sex offender registration policies:

  • Deters new offending; but,
  • Encourages repeat offending.

The policy-relevant part is probably the overall reduction, but it’s interesting to note the contrast between common wisdom and the results: the notion that notification helps the community protect their children appears to be unfounded and it actually makes previous offenders more dangerous.

Layoffs have costs, too

With the Ports of Auckland industrial dispute and the layoffs in the public sector, restructuring in the face of financial pressure seems very fashionable at the moment. Executives are quick to point to the cost savings of having fewer staff, or the potential productivity improvements. As the government says:

In a restricted funding environment we must find new ways to do more with less.

Of course, it is really only possible to do less with less, unless some staff are actually reducing what can be done. That seems unlikely, even though there may be some who are not providing value-for-money, as in any organisation. But there’s no point making a song and dance about obvious holes in what is more window dressing than substance. More interesting is to ask what the costs of these layoffs are. The short-term monetary costs to the organisation have been discussed by Danyl at Dim-Post:

…months of stop-work meetings, losing hundreds of millions of dollars in customers, sacking the entire work-force, paying millions more in redundancy and being placed on a global black-list is also going to compromise the efficiency and profits of the port, and its ability to return a dividend to the people of Auckland

The costs to those who have been laid off varies widely in monetary terms: some people will find jobs rapidly, while others languish on the unemployment benefit. But the real costs I want to discuss are the non-monetary costs to people’s wellbeing and self-worth. They’re the things you see on the front page of the newspaper, but aren’t often mentioned by economists talking about the macroeconomic impact. A recent NBER paper finds:

For those who are unemployed, the subjective well-being consequences can be divided into income and non-income effects, with the latter being five times larger than the former. This is similar to what has been found in many countries, as is our finding that the non-income effects are lower for individuals living in areas of high unemployment. …At the population level the spillover effects are twice as large as the direct effects, making the total well-being costs of unemployment fifteen times larger than those directly due to the lower incomes of the unemployed.

So the costs to society of the loss in self-worth from layoffs are huge. However, though these costs are large, it is worth asking ourselves how much account we want society to take of them. When thinking about non-monetary costs, it’s important to remember that a large part of the loss in welfare from unemployment is loss of social status. Now, loss of status isn’t something that affects everyone equally because people don’t start out with the same status prior to becoming The Unemployed. That manifests itself in ways that aren’t immediately obvious. For example, unemployment programmes that force a former accountant to work in fast food because they haven’t been able to find work elsewhere probably aren’t socially efficient: the loss in social status that the former accountant would suffer has large, long-term costs for their sense of self-worth. Since people are loss averse and work from the anchor of their current status, a reduction in their employment status is hugely costly to them. Because of that, it is hard to account for the social costs of unemployment without recognising that they are relative costs, and fall most heavily on those that were previously of high social status. That may not be something that an egalitarian society wants to take account of, given that the greatest absolute hardship is felt by those from poorer backgrounds who don’t have the same financial resources to fall on in difficult times.

Poor migrants

Contrast this new government policy:

Poor migrants who speak little or no English are to be subject to stricter immigration laws… Immigration categories are to be changed in an effort to “reduce the number of unskilled migrants who find it difficult to get jobs and are more likely to get benefit payments”.

to this academic research:

The vast wage differences across countries are a sizeable economic distortion, and offer the possibility of large gains through international migration. From a development perspective, a key challenge is to increase the opportunities for poor, relatively less skilled, individuals to participate in migration.

Read more

Cuts at MFAT need some context

The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) has today announced that over 300 jobs will be cut. As Phil Goff says, these job losses “…represent one in four Ministry employees”, so there is no doubt that they will hugely affect the Ministry’s capacity; however, the dramatic changes in capacity that will ensue have to be understood in context.

The review of policy expenditure commissioned by the government last year found that:

[Total spending] on policy advice appears to have grown by 24% between 2005/06 and 2010/11 (6% in real terms).

Most of the growth has occurred in MFAT. MFAT’s expenditure on policy advice grew by 72% in nominal terms (47% real) between 2005/06 and 2010/11. If MFAT is excluded, spending on policy advice by all other agencies is estimated to have grown by a nominal 16% (a decline of 0.6% in real terms). Growth in MFAT’s policy advice-related appropriations, which includes funding for international representation, was an estimated nominal 77% (51% real) over that period.

The report shows that, of the $380 million increase in total, nominal expenditure on policy, $180 million was due to MFAT’s expansion. No other agency’s policy expenditure grew by more than $32 million over that time (MAF, if you’re wondering). It may be that MFAT did a lot more work, too, but unless you think that MFAT was doing a terrible job under great duress prior to 2005, it is hard to argue that these cuts will “…undermine the ability of the Ministry to carry out its basic functions”, as Goff claims. Of course, the job losses will be very painful for all of the staff affected, but the growth of the Ministry over recent times makes the large cuts at MFAT no great surprise, given the government’s stated desire for spending restraint. They are also unlikely to be replicated in magnitude at other Ministries, since none have seen the growth in expenditure of MFAT.

Will the pseudoephedrine ban reduce P availability?

Oregon made pseudoephedrine-based cold medicines prescription-only back in 2006. A new report on the effectiveness in reducing the availability of P concludes:

Oregon’s experience with methamphetamine manufacture and abuse since 2006 does not stand out from its neighbors or other parts of the United States. This potentially calls into question whether Oregon’s Rx-only law had any independent effect on these key measures. Moreover, this law does come at some cost to consumers and government and private payers.

So the ban on selling effective cold medicine over the counter had no observable effect upon the P problem, but does cause inconvenience for people with a cold. It will be interesting to see comparable studies for New Zealand in a few years time, although the lack of neighbouring states makes it harder to find control groups to compare with.

Social smokers are the victims

According to the Dom Post there is new research out showing that banning smoking in places that people socialise will reduce social smoking:

New Zealand researchers believe fewer people would take up smoking socially if smoke-free rules extended to areas outside bars.

Alone, that sounds pretty innocuous. But how does it justify a headline like:

Study backs ban on smoking outside bars

As if the goal of healthcare policy should be to minimise gross harms, rather than maximise net benefits!

One interesting aspect of the article is that the social smokers themselves supported such a ban. Most reported smoking to fit in and be viewed as a part of the group, but said they would prefer it if none in the group smoked so they didn’t have to. The first reaction I had is that the social smokers are holding everythign else constant when they think about the benefits of a smoking ban: they’re assuming that the group will work the same way, just without the smoking. That’s a pretty big assumption to make, given that there are plenty of options open to the serious smokers.

Assuming that issue away, is this a co-ordination problem where people are stuck in an inferior, all-smoking equilibrium, or could everyone in the group be better off if the group didn’t smoke? Just as importantly, would the costs imposed on avowed smokers be greater than the benefits to social smokers who would prefer not to smoke? The most obvious solution is a mechanism that allows social smokers to precommit to not smoking, but that mechanism appears to elude people so far.