TVHE

Over at Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, Nick Rowe suggests that central banks should find something else to discuss instead of interest rates.  The analogy provided is that of oligopoly competition: namely how the Cournot-Nash and Bertrand games have exceedingly different outcomes, even though the only superficial difference is that one game involves choosing output and the other game involves choosing price.

However, in the same way I don’t believe the difference in these games is just the product of “framing”, I am not sure if the call to arms against using interest rates as a focal point is necessarily that compelling.

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There is some suggestion that the size and scope of governments around the world has become excessive.  Two recent examples of this are:

• From the Economist,
• From Reform, in the UK.

The Standard has suggested that similar comparison in NZ could be a little out of whack, and in the most part I agree with them.  After all, Labour was elected to a third term on the promise of larger government, National was re-elected to keep it at that level, as a result I think society is suggesting that they want government to continue spending a quarter of our income.

However, I do disagree with them with regards to the idea that government spending didn’t markedly rise as a proportion of GDP in Labour’s third term – to me the GDP Statistics seem to suggest this was the big mover (with the recent increase solely the result of a recession, and “automatic stabilisers”):

Over at Kiwiblog there is discussion of the Democrat loss in Massachusetts.  Reading through the piece David Farrar stated:

Priorities. Obama’s fiscal stimulus did little bar increase the deficit massively, and turn the country into deficit hawks. Unemployment went well beyond his worst forecasts

Now I found this statement unusal in that David’s writing is usually very balanced, and yet I do not find this statement balanced at all.  Why?

1. We have no idea if Obama’s fiscal stimulus did anything until the data is all finalised.  In a couple of years researchers will be able to look over the data and discuss the design, implementation, and need of the scheme and reach an educated conclusion.  At the moment people can only present an opinion on the basis of ideology.
2. Personally (going onto my ideology ), I think the fact that unemployment rose even further than expected was the result of the shock being larger than expected (and areas of the US economy being more fragile).  During the crisis the US government was able to borrow cheaply and use this borrowing to undertake investment when the cost of building this investment was cheap (thanks to the spare capacity in the economy) This sounds like a good thing to me …
3. Unemployment as high as  10% indicates to me that there was a hole in demand – I do not believe that “structural” economic issues could be sufficient enough to warrant 1/10 people who want a job not being able to get a job.  With the Fed unwilling to soften its monetary stance further the government is in a position to be “consumer of last resort”.  Although I don’t really like the idea of this, in the face of sticky prices and a massive shock to the economy I have to concede that such a role exists in extreme circumstances.

As a result, if I had to guess I would say that the immediate crisis would have been worse if the stimulus hadn’t happened. This appears to be a moderate position among economists, between the “stimulus did nothing” and the “we needed more stimulus” extremes.

Now, we may find that the long run impact of this borrowing will be bad, and we may look back on the evidence and find that the scheme is flawed.  However, the point that “Obama’s fiscal stimulus did little bar increase the deficit massively” is an extreme view (that could potentially turn out to be true) – not an objective fact.

The Tax Working Group has released their report, as you all already know.  The recommendations are as expected, so its not particularly exciting in that sense.

However, there are some issues I would like to discuss – lets start with the idea that we “urgently need to cut the corporate tax rate” if Australia does.

Currently there is talk that, if Aussie cuts the corporate tax rate to 30% we need to do the same immediately.  We are told this as if it is a self-evident truth, and told that if we don’t all investment will head to Australia.  This is a touch over the top.

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I started life as a microeconomist, which is why the sort of discussion about nominal shocks going on between Sumner, Kling, and Woolsey seems a little weird to me.

To horrendously oversimplify the positions in order to make this post easier to tie together, Sumner seems to state that the Fed needs to print money with a nominal GDP target in mind, Woolsey suggests that the Fed should change inflationary pressure given a set real GDP target, and Kling states that we only have real shocks and so the idea of a “nominal shock” is not of use.

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Things are generally looking better for New Zealand.  Consumer, business, and forecaster expectations of growth have improved, our trading partners are stabilising, and financial markets are functioning.  Yay.

But one piece of data that leaves me a little cautious is the money stock data.  The broadest measure of the money stock (M3)  declined 2% on a year earlier in November.  This was the largest decline on record (going back to 1960).

Furthermore, following this release the New Zealand dollar has climbed sharply.

If the declines in the money stock are sustained, and the higher dollar is also sustained, there is one clear interpretation – market expectations of demand driven deflation.

Of course, this data is volatile and rising commodity price expectations and the such can be used to explain the change in the dollar, but …

Justin Wolfers says Charles Plosser is being a bit silly on the Freakonomics blog.

Specifically he says that:

1. Plosser says we should tighten more quickly than estimates of “slack” suggest, as the level of slack is uncertain,
2. However, since slack is uncertain it could be higher or lower – so this doesn’t make sense unless you weigh the outcome with lower slack more highly than the outcome with higher slack, which seems wrong!

Now I think he is being a bit sneaky here.  Yes there is uncertainty, but the perceived ex-ante risks around this uncertain variable are asymmetric.

What the hell am I trying to say here?  Well, we know that potential economic activity seems to be “trend stationary” over time (so it tends to rise at an average rate), however we aren’t quiet sure of the trend.  When we measure “slack” in a “recession” we are normally coming off a high point – which biases up our trend estimate.  Macroeconomists do heaps of stuff to try and correct it – but we often end up with a higher estimate than seems fair.

As a result, even though slack is uncertain there is a greater likelihood that slack will turn out to be smaller than it is currently thought to be rather than larger.

Of course, on an unrelated note I would say that economists should look at the unemployment rate as a measure of slack a lot of the time – as we have a measure of it, and it does give us an indication of the relative “hole” in the economy.  With unemployment over 10% the US should still be looking at substantial stimulus – so Plosser seems a little gun ho.

There seems to be some hatred for the idea that if nominal wages were more flexible unemployment would not rise as high (here, here, and here).

However, I am a fan of the flexibility argument – and not just because my mind struggles to get outside of partial equilibrium

When I view wage flexibility I think about it in THREE ways that would lead to an improvement in outcomes – in so far as they would reduce the “market failure” that leads to a “surplus of labour”.  These are both RELATIVE PRICE arguments:

1. Wages relative to substitute inputs:  Wages need to be able to adjust more quickly than other inputs.  If this is the case then employers would cut back on other inputs ahead of labour.  Given that there is both substitutability and complementarity in inputs this is a difficult issue – but nonetheless.
2. Wages relative to goods:  Wages need to be able to adjust more quickly than goods prices.  That way real wages will decline, making labour relatively cheaper.
3. Relative wages:  This is the big one for me.  Often during a recession there may need to be a reallocation of labour resources, or there may be uneven shifts in demand for types of labour.  If relative wages can adjust then we ensure that the cost (in terms of climbing unemployment and general economic inefficiency) can be minimised.

In a recent post Paul Krugman raises the “paradox of toil” to explain why tax cuts are silly and government spending is good during a recession:

So what’s the paradox of toil? If you cut taxes on labor income, this expands labor supply — which puts downward pressure on wages and leads to expectations of deflation, which increases the real interest rate, which leads to lower output and employment.

However, this is completely misleading.  Cutting a tax doesn’t really “shift the supply curve” (which is what expanding the labour supply means) in this way.  Lets have a little think about wages and what cutting the tax probably does.

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Land tax.  It is a popular idea among economists.

However, I have heard some people pushing it based on getting land “in use” (this was mentioned at Kiwiblog for example).  I am not sure if I agree on this point.

Saying that we should tax land so people use it is similar to saying we should cut benefits to get labour “in use”.  Both these arguments involve increasing individual costs to get “activity” going.  This isn’t necessarily welfare optimal.  Remember the goal of policy is not to increase productivity or to get our GDP number as big as possible, it is to ensure that we have a society where net happiness is as high as possible.

Focusing on getting things “in use” by pushing a cost on private individuals does not ensure that net happiness will be higher, and is definitely a violation of the principal for policy we suggested here that:

Any regulation should be based on the idea of avoiding coercion either from the private or the public sector

Arbitrarily adding costs to get people to arbitrarily do other things is coercion, and I don’t know if I can support the actions of any private or public agents that are based solely on coercion.

I like a land tax as a replacement for other taxes given that the elasticities of supply and demand are low – implying that the “deadweight loss” from taxation will be relatively low.  Furthermore, the tax on land is a “fixed cost” of production, implying that the impact on downstream costs should be minimal (depending on how this changes relative land use in the long-run of course).

These reasons are not related to some arbitrary goal of maximising statistics, but instead on the idea that we should be trying to raise any target level of revenue at the lowest possible social cost.