TVHE

Economist’s View links to a post on the Vox EU site by Hans Gersbach.  At the start of the post Mark Thoma states:

I have argued many times that the Fed should have two roles. It should conduct monetary policy, and it should be the primary regulator of the financial system. However, not everyone agrees. When I was at the What’s Wrong with Modern Macro Conference in Munich recently, I met Hans Gersbach — we were on a panel together — and he passes along his argument that monetary policy and banking regulation should be conducted by separate bodies

So the disagreement here is not about the two instruments for central banks – in fact in the monetary policy community there is a strong degree of agreement regarding these two roles.  The disagreement stems from who should be in charge of the instruments – should we have one authority controlling both, or separate authorities.

This is a fascinating issue, and I have previously said I am on the side of SEPARATING.

My reasoning is that separating “monetary” and “financial stability” issues is essential in order to create transperancy in the public regarding policy movements.  If we can make sure that changes in the Bank’s cash rate are related to “monetary” policy and changes in prudential regulation/settings are related to “financial stability”.  By doing this, the actions/intentions of the individual institutions are more obvious and are more likely to anchor expectations – which is the point.

Of course monetary and financial stability policies, and these instruments (interest rates and prudential policy) are heavily related.  But of course, we know that monetary policy and fiscal policy is as well.  The fact is that in order to signal policy and control expectations we NEED individual instruments to be targeted at individual variables – and having separate institutions helps to clarify this fact.

Over at Worthwhile Canadian Initiative, Nick Rowe suggests that central banks should find something else to discuss instead of interest rates.  The analogy provided is that of oligopoly competition: namely how the Cournot-Nash and Bertrand games have exceedingly different outcomes, even though the only superficial difference is that one game involves choosing output and the other game involves choosing price.

However, in the same way I don’t believe the difference in these games is just the product of “framing”, I am not sure if the call to arms against using interest rates as a focal point is necessarily that compelling.

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We are sadly too busy to really post anything at the moment.

As a result, to fill in time we will put up a recent discussion between TVHE writers.  The one thing this conversation shows:  we all agree that arbitrary policies that are introduced to indirectly target a problem (eg changing the minimum wage to target inflation) tend to do more harm than good.

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Things are generally looking better for New Zealand.  Consumer, business, and forecaster expectations of growth have improved, our trading partners are stabilising, and financial markets are functioning.  Yay.

But one piece of data that leaves me a little cautious is the money stock data.  The broadest measure of the money stock (M3)  declined 2% on a year earlier in November.  This was the largest decline on record (going back to 1960).

Furthermore, following this release the New Zealand dollar has climbed sharply.

If the declines in the money stock are sustained, and the higher dollar is also sustained, there is one clear interpretation – market expectations of demand driven deflation.

Of course, this data is volatile and rising commodity price expectations and the such can be used to explain the change in the dollar, but …

Justin Wolfers says Charles Plosser is being a bit silly on the Freakonomics blog.

Specifically he says that:

1. Plosser says we should tighten more quickly than estimates of “slack” suggest, as the level of slack is uncertain,
2. However, since slack is uncertain it could be higher or lower – so this doesn’t make sense unless you weigh the outcome with lower slack more highly than the outcome with higher slack, which seems wrong!

Now I think he is being a bit sneaky here.  Yes there is uncertainty, but the perceived ex-ante risks around this uncertain variable are asymmetric.

What the hell am I trying to say here?  Well, we know that potential economic activity seems to be “trend stationary” over time (so it tends to rise at an average rate), however we aren’t quiet sure of the trend.  When we measure “slack” in a “recession” we are normally coming off a high point – which biases up our trend estimate.  Macroeconomists do heaps of stuff to try and correct it – but we often end up with a higher estimate than seems fair.

As a result, even though slack is uncertain there is a greater likelihood that slack will turn out to be smaller than it is currently thought to be rather than larger.

Of course, on an unrelated note I would say that economists should look at the unemployment rate as a measure of slack a lot of the time – as we have a measure of it, and it does give us an indication of the relative “hole” in the economy.  With unemployment over 10% the US should still be looking at substantial stimulus – so Plosser seems a little gun ho.

One of my favourite excuses for the “high” NZ dollar is currency reserves being built up overseas (in order to “keep their currency low” they need to buy up foreign dosh, building up currency reserves you see).  It is an argument the US likes to make without actually doing any analysis as well.

However, work has been done … a while back.

The linked to paper found that reserves were not excessive anywhere, expect China.  A good point to keep in mind no doubt.

Sounds like what we’ve been saying here.  From over there:

1. The Fed should have a single nominal target.
2. The Fed needs to be transparent and have specific and well-defined monetary policy goals.
3. The Fed should focus only on monetary policy, and regulation of the large banks.

From over here:

• At its heart, the consensus between the two main parties was to do with the target of monetary policy – monetary policy must be implemented by an independent Reserve Bank to ensure that inflation remains within a low and narrow band.
• Giving the Bank multiple instruments to simultaneously achieve multiple targets would be a recipe for confusion, and would ultimately damage its ability to achieve any of its targets
• Warping the Reserve Bank Act to focus on a multitude of different goals will not solve these underlying issues; it will just cloak the symptoms by damaging other sections of the economy

In a recent post Paul Krugman raises the “paradox of toil” to explain why tax cuts are silly and government spending is good during a recession:

So what’s the paradox of toil? If you cut taxes on labor income, this expands labor supply — which puts downward pressure on wages and leads to expectations of deflation, which increases the real interest rate, which leads to lower output and employment.

However, this is completely misleading.  Cutting a tax doesn’t really “shift the supply curve” (which is what expanding the labour supply means) in this way.  Lets have a little think about wages and what cutting the tax probably does.

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Given the rising pressure for the Reserve Bank to target the currency as well as other things in New Zealand it is important to have a look at reasons why people may think our currency is misaligned.  I have said before that IF the currency is overvalued I think it is a structural issue and is really unrelated to monetary policy – however, there are of course many other arguments.

We have mentioned the begger thy neighbour type externalities from domestic focused monetary policy – something that a small country like NZ cannot cause, and so we can’t blame our domestic monetary environment for.

And a new discussion paper by the Dallas Fed discusses why the exchange rate may be an important issue to look at intervening into (ht Econobrowser).  Specifically the paper states:

If the nominal exchange rate regime matters for the determination of relative prices such as the real exchange rate or the terms of trade, it must matter because there is some kind of nominal price stickiness. For example, if the U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate is to affect any real prices, it must be because there are some nominal prices that are sticky in dollar terms and others that are sticky in euros. From the standpoint of modern macroeconomics, the question should be posed: What policy best deals with the distortions from sticky prices and other sources? Is it a fully flexible exchange rate, or some sort of exchange rate targeting?

However, coming back to New Zealand I still feel fully flexible exchange rates are appropriate.  Why?  Apart from the fact that I view such a “relative price shock” as an insufficient condition for intervention, the idea of price stickiness only matters when export prices are SET by exporters.  New Zealand is a small open economy that sells on foreign markets and receives (and pays) the world price – therefore our trade prices are flexible.

The inefficiency occurs when prices are denominated in domestic dollars, and do not change in the face of some “shock” which changes the value of the exchange rate.

Finally there is an asset price bubble argument for intervention (as the currency is a forward looking asset price).  Whether we can really identify and then improve welfare by intervening against “currency bubbles” is highly debatable – and it is an area the Bank has already been involved in (by becoming a currency trader )

While working on the Dom Post article I was given a few questions I might get.  I quickly tried to rope together some incredibly average answers.  I am going to post them here so I don’t lose them

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