TVHE

David Farrar states that this is how Labour has framed the idea of tax cuts – a $150,000 pay increase for Jack Paul Reynolds, and only a few dollars for the rest of us. David states that we must look at the macroeconomic impact, and that we can’t focus on who gets what, specifically he says:

If the debate becomes one of simply who gets how much, they will have problems

However, I think the debate about who gets what is important.  However, I do not think that it actually falls in Labour’s favour.

Jack Paul has specific skills, he is hard to replace, and is seen to add a lot of value.  The “elasticity of demand” for his service is very very high low.  Furthermore, he has a lot of high paying outside options – he has a good reputation as a CEO.  This means that his “elasticity of supply” is very high (note that I am using quite a discrete margin in this case).

What does this mean?  Well, when he labour income is taxed, the FIRM will pick up the tab – as a result his gross wage is representative of this.  Now this also indicates that, when taxes are lower, the tax payment by the firm will be lower.  As a result, over time his gross wage will adjust DOWN to represent this lower tax rate.

As a result, the direct impact on Jack’s Paul’s pay packet is likely to be very low proportional to both income and what other people receive.  It is Telecom that faces most of the “incidence of tax” in this case – not him.

As a result, a tax cut isn’t a $150,000 pay increase for Jack Paul.  Nowhere near in fact.  National should be using basic economics to debunk these sorts of myths, so that Labour can’t try to pitch it as a class war.

Nick Rowe has a great post on technology and labour.  Fundamentally, it states that, one day, increases technology and improving capital will replace labour, destroying demand for labour.  I was discussing a similar issue with Linuxlover on Twitter (and who blogs here).

Both men seemed to imply that such a situation could be a bad thing.  Linux lover told me of the “legion of unemployed”, while Nick mentioned a book that states:

It describes life in the near-future when technology and machines have destroyed the demand for nearly all human labour, except for the labour of a small, highly-educated minority. The vast majority of the population would be unemployed, but for government make-work projects

However, I am not afraid of such an occurrence per see – in fact I am excited.  Why?  What is wrong with me?

Read more…

There is talk that a lower income tax might, at the margin, reduce immigration.  Now when the income tax cut is measured with an increase in consumption taxes, this argument becomes a lot weaker.

By taxing consumption instead of income we increase the price of everything, and thereby lower incomes.  If people HAD to consume in the same place where they worked then this would have no impact on immigration incentives at all!!

If people could decide to save (which we could) then shifting from income tax to consumption tax gives people, at the margin, the incentive to work in New Zealand – but to move away and use this income somewhere else.

When the shift is introduced we are increasing the cost of consumption domestically – so people who have saved will want to move away (at the margin) and people who have borrowed will be more likely to stay in the country.

The net impact on migration is going to be ambiguous, but on the margin we can tell that there will be more incentive to work here and less incentive to spend here.

Of course this ignores one major thing, the dollar will fall to compensate for the change in the price level – implying that an “unexpected” increase in GST could have no impact at all at the margin for those with savings or borrowing (as the lower dollar reduces the value of domestic income overseas and makes consumption here cheaper for those with foreign income – thereby increasing the incentive for people who have saved to move here, and reducing the incentive for those who have borrowed to move here)

There is a feeling out there that the increase in GST would be pointless if completely compensated.  I’m not sure I agree.

Even with a fully compensated scheme, and even given some welfare costs, there are reasons why we may want to shift the burden from income to consumption:

1. Consumption tax is easier to enforce (self-reinforcing) – therefore it will be cheaper to implement and have less avoidence,
2. On a similar note, with a consumption tax it is easier to ensure that the tax falls equally on all income,
3. Given income tax also hits interest income, a consumption tax treats current and future income equally while an income tax promotes current consumption, (note that this does imply that the baseline rate must be slightly higher

Now, having it set up in the fully compensated way does imply that effective marginal tax rates are unchanged – and therefore so are labour supply incentives.  When thinking about “productivity” and the such the changes to the top tax rate, and to taxes on property, will be more important – but we won’t know about that until May

Following recent events it is obvious that New Zealand will do a “compensated shift” of the tax system away from income tax and towards consumption tax – removing a “flat component” of income tax and replacing it with a flat income tax.

Lovely.

However, when we think about the happiness and general welfare of society there are issues that appear given such a change.  One issue I want to focus on is timing, specifically the role of credit constraints in making GST a more “welfare damaging” tax then a tax on income.

When credit markets are imperfect (say because of information asymmetries) individuals can become “credit constrained”.  Namely, someone who expects to have a high lifetime income, but has low current income, cannot borrow to “smooth consumption” over their lifetime.  This is costly as agents who could lend to each other profitably in the perfect information case don’t, it is a market failure.

Now, if we tax consumption instead of income we are taxing the credit constrained individuals more NOW and less in the future.  As a result, their disposable income is lower now than it would have been.  As they are unable to borrow on their higher future income they are less able to smooth consumption.

The best example of people in this situation are tertiary students – in reality they should be the main people complaining about this change to the tax system.

When discussing the upcoming changes to the New Zealand tax system the National party has made it clear that they want any change in GST to be “compensated”, so that those on low income aren’t “worse off”.

Now this is actually a wildly complicated question.  Any change will create winners and losers, that is undeniable.  If we think of compensation in welfare terms there is no way to perfectly compensate everyone without making any change viciously complicated – or not making any changes at all.

My presumption is that the goal isn’t “welfare compensation” per see.  My guess is that any compensation will be such that people (outside the property sector and those in the top income bracket – where a rejig “might” take place) will pay the same proportion of their lifetime income in tax (although any progressivity from any change in incomes will also be accepted).

Why do I think this?

Read more…

I don’t like the idea of a “zero tax” threshold at the bottom of the tax system.  I see it was suggested today by Mark Keating, so I thought I should explain why I feel this way (ht Kiwiblog).  I’ll put down three reasons, in reality the third reason is by far the most important:

1. I don’t believe the cost of “churn” is very substantial – implying that any benefit from setting a zero tax will be negligible compared to taking the tax and sending it back.
2. The effort required to set a zero tax and enforce payment of tax when moving out of the bracket requires effort as well – as a result I don’t think it is self-evident that setting a new bracket would reduce administration costs (it might even increase them).
3. If we set a zero tax bracket this also acts as a tax cut for EVERYONE earning more than that amount.  This has to be paid for by INCREASING other tax rates (substantially as well, since the loss of the bottom bracket will cost more than an equivalent cut anywhere else).  As a result, effective marginal tax rates will be higher than if we taxed and paid benefits (for the same average tax rate in other words).  This reduces labour supply incentives for higher income earners.  As these earners tend to be more responsive to tax there would be a SIGNIFICANT efficiency cost.

Yes, the zero tax rate at the bottom will increase labour supply incentives for those on very low incomes.  But this will only lead to efficiency gains if we believe it will get the more elastic secondary earners into the labour market.  If we are doing it to promote equity it doesn’t make sense – as those that are actually poor are likely to provide very inelastic labour supply.  Overall, it is likely that the negative impact of higher EMTR’s on middle and high income earners will outweigh any positive impact through a increase in, our already enormous, part time labour force.

The purpose of the zero tax bracket is to make sure that people get a minimum living standard.  The better way to do this is to ensure that society pays everyone a living wage at whatever level it believes is fair.  Leave redistribution to the welfare system (where our social value judgments are transparent), tax needs to be applied on the basis of efficiency in order to be effective.

I am still feeling tired from Christmas, but my pre-set posts from before the break are now finished.

I did watch Sweeney Todd last night (the movie) and so will leave you with the two posts I did about the movie and welfare policies here and here.  Be warned, there are spoilers.

If we follow Australia down the road of trade protectionism for movies, then we all lose out.  What do I mean?

Well the incentives for trade protectionism is a prisoner’s dilemma.

As Peter Jackson says, if Australia starts subsidising movies we need to do the same or we will miss out on productions – as a result our best response to their protectionism is more protectionism.  Furthermore, if we start subsidising and Australia doesn’t then we get a relatively larger share of the movie industry – assume that this occurs to the point where the tax revenue from the movies exceeds the cost of the subsidies.  In this case our best response is to ALWAYS subsidise.

However, there are two issues.  Firstly it is in Australia’s interest to subsidise (it is also their “dominant strategy”).  And secondly, the decision to subsidise pays off because it hurts Australia.  In the end both countries end up subsidising movies, and both sets of taxpayers end up worse off than in the case when neither country subsidises.

This is the issue, not only with the subsidies on movies, but on all trade protectionism.  That is why we need international co-operation to avoid this type of beggar thy neighbour behaviour.

Seriously, so the UK is going to arbitrarily tax bonuses at 50% because they are not “generating real wealth” they are just “rent seeking” (Will Hutton and Paul Krugman feel this way).  Wow.

The decision to pay a wage, or a bonus, is voluntary.  Given that these bankers are creating sufficient value through their work to extract these wages/bonuses why shouldn’t they get their wage/bonus.  They are generating sufficient “wealth” through their activities – or else they would i) get undercut by other labour, ii) not get paid by clients.

Yes the organisations that got bailed out should have to pay back their bailouts.  Yes, we should try to avoid the current moral hazard problem that could exist in the industry (on the basis of the bailouts mind you – which is government intervention). However, shouldn’t the solutions to these issues be focused on the actual issues – rather than arbitrarily attacking bonuses (which will simply be delayed to avoid the tax for those that can afford it).

If we think that the price paid for the financial labour service is out of whack because of some sort of direct market failure then tax it.  If we are trying to work out optimal tax and we find that the supply and demand for these services is perfectly inelastic, potentially shift the tax burden.  But that isn’t what the authors are doing.  They are accusing bankers of being the equivalent of organised crime and then stating that we should punitively attack.  I’m sorry but I find this attitude simply abhorrent.

Seriously, if you have something specifically against bankers, lets apply the logic somewhere else:

UK is going to arbitrarily tax teachers at 50% because they are not “generating real wealth” they are just “rent seeking”

After all, teachers don’t build physical things they just provide a service like the bankers.  If we are going to attack bankers for there being a credit crisis, why don’t we just start taxing teachers more because we “feel like educational standards are too low”.

Update:  Stumbling and mumbling also believes bank bonuses should be hammered.  However, he at least paints his argument out in full and so deserves to be heard.  I don’t agree, but that isn’t really the point