In its eternal quest to “not be evil” Google has decided to take on one of the banes of man – himself, and his time-inconsistency.
It is doing this by introducing a new service to gmail. You can set up this service to significantly increase the transaction cost associated with sending an email when you are drunk!
In the “drunk” state you may think it is a good idea to email your ex girlfriend/boyfriend and say strange things – however, prior to being drunk you may decide that any benefit associated with emailing someone in your drunk state is more than canceled out by the embarrassing phone call the next day.
This feature allows you to increase the cost to writing the email in your drunk state – allowing you to “pre-commit” to not sending embarrassing emails.
With classy features like this you can tell that a genius like Hal Varian is working for them 
How do we think the introduction of Kiwisaver has influenced the current economic environment?
Well, Kiwisaver will have worked through a number of channels but fundamentally, in the short term, it would have propped up savings (note, when I say savings I am talking about PRIVATE savings, not NATIONAL savings) and thereby reduced CONSUMPTION. Where does it increase savings:
- It effectively implies a higher tax rate – as money going into Kiwisaver is money that could have been redistributed through the tax system.
- By using tax money as a carrot it increases the incentive to save beyond that implied by the market – fundamentally, the government takes your own money and says it will only give it back if you save.
As we are struggling with a crisis of confidence, a short-term decline in consumption is probably not what we needed 
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When I drink on Friday I suffer from a commitment problem (likely stemming from my own time inconsistency *). Fundamentally, before drinking I don’t want to go into town and drink too much (as I have work to do on Saturday), the next day I would prefer it if I hadn’t drunk a lot, but once I start drinking I find it hard to stop
One way to pre-commit to not drinking too much is to not drink. However, I don’t like this solution at all. I want to have a few drinks with my work mates, and with my friends later on – but I would like to avoid drinking too much. Now, the “too much” bit actually occurs when I go out into town after work drinks – as a result if there was some way I could commit to not going out, I would be able to pre-commit to not drinking too much!
That is what I have done today – by taking casual Friday to the extreme I have ensured that most bars in Wellington will not let me in, removing the temptation to go into town by taking away my ability to. However, I will still be able to have a couple of beers at work and then head around to my friends house for a few beverages – thereby ensuring that I reach a superior outcome to the “don’t drink” scenario.
Hi all. Good to see people commenting on re-thinking interest rate policy here, I am going to give it another day for people to make comments (as I am waiting for some specific people) and then I’ll start writing things up on the weekend – so if there is anything you want to add, go there are add it!
Today I’m going to ask a couple of questions to Rauparaha (or anyone else that knows some stuff) about time inconsistency (using smoking as an example), an issue that Rauparaha covered here. Now I know close to nothing about this stuff – but hopefully a discussion on it will enlight me, and potential other readers 
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So far we have discussed Kiwisaver and national savings in fairly loose terms. We know that (part of) the purpose of Kiwisaver was to increase national savings and that our interest in national savings stems from the fact that we want New Zealand to have more productive capital.
So before we can discuss the myriad of burning questions surrounding these issues – and more broadly surrounding New Zealand’s productivity (such as if Kiwisaver achieves the greater capital goal even if it theoretically doesn’t increase savings) we need to ask, what is the savings problem?
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I’ve talked a lot before about hyperbolic discounting, time inconsistency and smoking. Reading a paper by Gruber and Koszegi on the topic yesterday, I came across an interesting little aside.
They point out that, for an addict, smoking in different periods is complementary. That means that taxes to overcome time inconsistency problems are substitutes: if your tax in one period is too low then you can compensate by raising it in another period. The same holds in a spatial sense: if you can’t prevent smoking in the home then this rationale suggests that over-regulating smoking in public places is optimal. It’s an interesting way to look at banning smoking in public places because it is specifically targeting the welfare of the smokers, not considering externalities to third parties.
I went to a debate about climate change a few days ago and, uncharacteristically, decided to take notes of my thoughts throughout the talk. In order that they not be wasted I’ve decided to do a series of posts on some of the interesting points that came up in the course of the seminar. Today’s topic is whether it would be less costly to delay doing something about climate change. Read more…
More research out of Massey has recommended increasing government regulation. In this case, researchers found that the display case for cigarettes makes them too tempting for those trying to quit and for rebellious teenagers. As it is election year, politicians are interested in this ‘issue’ and are thinking about tightening the regulation surrounding these cigarette cases.
Externality taxes and regulation are two of our favorite topics on this blog (see here, here, here, and here), and as a result we have to talk about it.
In order to start to analyse this problem, I’m going to use one of our old posts on porn and manipulation.
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What do the Reserve Bank and eateries have in common? Both implement rule based policies instead of discretionary policies and both suffer criticism from their clientèle for doing so even though it is in the clients ultimate interest.
I noticed this today when I went to get some food for lunch. A man in front of me was trying to get cash out, when there is a sign that says “no cash out” at the counter. The man was irritated by this rule, he wanted cash and there was cash in the till. The service person tried to explain to him that if they let people get cash out, then they ran out of change in the counter, which causes delays later in the day – furthermore, if they give him cash they run the chance that other people may begin expecting that they can get cash out, and employees would feel more obliged to. As there was a cash machine just outside, the cost of getting the cash somewhere else was very low for the man, however the delays later in the day would have been costly for both the firm and the consumers involved. In this case, the rule improved the social outcome – any deviation from this rule may change peoples beliefs and lead to a case where most people are worse off.
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Matt and I recently discussed whether we thought the government should intervene to correct intra-personal externalities that arise from time inconsistency in peoples’ behaviour. We particularly talked about smoking: models of smoking which incorporate hyperbolic discounting predict that people will want to quit in the future but will never be able to quit when the time comes (and here I’ve horribly conflated two different causes of dynamic inconsistency in the interests of simplicity). I wasn’t able to persuade him that it is in the public interest to correct such externalities, but perhaps this paper(NBER) cited on MR provides a harsher example of the consequences of time inconsistency (and, yes, I know I’m horribly mangling together two different causes of dynamic inconsistency).
The authors find that
…women who are the victims of domestic violence often leave and return multiple times. … We present supporting evidence that women in violent relationships display time inconsistent preferences… We find that “no-drop” policies — which compel the prosecutor to continue with prosecution even if the victim expresses a desire to drop the charges — result in an increase in reporting. No-drop policies also result in a decrease in the number of men murdered by intimates suggesting that some women in violent relationships move away from an extreme type of commitment device when a less costly one is offered.
The problem here is that there is no device available to the women that allows them to commit to leaving the relationship and force their ‘future self’ not to return. A no-drop policy on the part of prosecutors gives them that precommitment power and prevents them from reneging on their desire to leave the abusive relationship. By restricting the womens’ future choice set the state can make them better off. I feel bad talking about domestic violence in such dry terminology, but I think this is a really good example of how economic theory can help understand important ‘real world’ problems. Policies such as taxation of smoking and no-drop prosecution of domestic violence are not examples of government interference in peoples’ lives: they are examples of the government helping people to help themselves.
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