TVHE

I agree with Dim Post that the choice of countries to add to the choice of countries made in the Spirit Level is a bit arbitrary (although I think Not PC and Kiwiblog also have a point regarding how sensitive the regression results are to the choice of countries that aren’t strictly the largest outliers in the sample) – but I still think that this particular “regression” is a steaming pile of unmentionables.

Lets ignore the fact that the slope of the  “regression line” appears very sensitive to the addition of a few countries.  Lets instead focus on the fact that it is a poor regression and that there isn’t a clear “theoretical background for causation”.

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… why don’t we just have a land tax, instead of trying to restrict voluntary trade of land between individuals.

My impression has always been that one of the fundamental reasons for tax was to proxy for a social return on a nations capital – such as land.  By doing this we get the advantage of actual property rights on land, even though in essence we hold a belief that society as a whole owns that land.

Now my impression of this debate is that NZ society DOES believe it implicitly owns the land.  If we had a land tax that proxied the “rental income” for society, it wouldn’t matter who owned the property right to use the land and this whole debate about foreign ownership could be chucked out the window.

Another point in favour of land tax is it?

Update:  Danylmc at Dim Post discusses the same article.  I’m not sure I would interpret history the same way as him – was there really much of a cost from the running down of our grossly inefficient railway system?  However, lets not argue about this point here – as it is peripheral to both posts.  There are two primary points that need to be raised beyond my land tax call above.

Firstly, if the problem is that the government sold the asset too cheaply, then we should raise that as the issue.

Secondly the arbitrary idea of a “strategic asset” might crop up – if we want to think along these lines, lets actually do some thinking.  We should ask “is it a public good”, “are there competition issues” and/or “are there externalities from the assets use”.  If these things hold, then we can ask what is the best way to define ownership.

Yes there are cases where the government should own assets – but they should be determined by analysis instead of arbitrary catch phrases like “strategic asset”.  Obviously there are too many management consultants floating around government at the moment given the amount that term is floating about.

In an email exchange with fellow economists from around the place I made the following wild conjectures on why fiscal stimulus could be seen as a good idea – but isn’t necessarily first best.  Feel free to read and critique

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Via Tyler Cowen’s twitter:

Some people hate me for this view, but TARP is looking better all the time.

I agree.  This will be worth a post at some point – but not today

People who have a free moment, feel free to discuss it in the comments

Were inextricably linked.  A quote that illustrates this to me strongly came from a Bloomberg article today.  The ECB decided to tell the countries that have high soverign debts to go to hell, and now that they aren’t going to take on the risk themselves private investors aren’t willing to and are selling.

This makes sense, previously people purchased the junk on the basis that someone else would pay for it – high return low risk!  Now that they have to face the real risk profile they are like “f**k that”.  However, Bloomberg (or at least David Kovacs) stated:

The reason the market is horrified now is Trichet said it’s not even being discussed. Smart investors are basically selling risk(y) assets

No s**t.  An asset appeared low risk, and now it is high risk, and the expected return is (at most) unchanged – so the risk adjusted return is lower.  No wonder they want to sell.

Now we are in a crisis, and if there is a run on good quality debt because of concerns we have to do strange things – sure.  But we need to come up with a system that rips this moral hazard out of the system.  It is the moral hazard that helps to drive crisis after crisis ultimately.

Here are two articles against a Robin Hood tax:

One from me (also here) and one from Patrick Nolan.

Feel free to comment about them here.

We are sadly too busy to really post anything at the moment.

As a result, to fill in time we will put up a recent discussion between TVHE writers.  The one thing this conversation shows:  we all agree that arbitrary policies that are introduced to indirectly target a problem (eg changing the minimum wage to target inflation) tend to do more harm than good.

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Given the rising pressure for the Reserve Bank to target the currency as well as other things in New Zealand it is important to have a look at reasons why people may think our currency is misaligned.  I have said before that IF the currency is overvalued I think it is a structural issue and is really unrelated to monetary policy – however, there are of course many other arguments.

We have mentioned the begger thy neighbour type externalities from domestic focused monetary policy – something that a small country like NZ cannot cause, and so we can’t blame our domestic monetary environment for.

And a new discussion paper by the Dallas Fed discusses why the exchange rate may be an important issue to look at intervening into (ht Econobrowser).  Specifically the paper states:

If the nominal exchange rate regime matters for the determination of relative prices such as the real exchange rate or the terms of trade, it must matter because there is some kind of nominal price stickiness. For example, if the U.S. dollar/euro exchange rate is to affect any real prices, it must be because there are some nominal prices that are sticky in dollar terms and others that are sticky in euros. From the standpoint of modern macroeconomics, the question should be posed: What policy best deals with the distortions from sticky prices and other sources? Is it a fully flexible exchange rate, or some sort of exchange rate targeting?

However, coming back to New Zealand I still feel fully flexible exchange rates are appropriate.  Why?  Apart from the fact that I view such a “relative price shock” as an insufficient condition for intervention, the idea of price stickiness only matters when export prices are SET by exporters.  New Zealand is a small open economy that sells on foreign markets and receives (and pays) the world price – therefore our trade prices are flexible.

The inefficiency occurs when prices are denominated in domestic dollars, and do not change in the face of some “shock” which changes the value of the exchange rate.

Finally there is an asset price bubble argument for intervention (as the currency is a forward looking asset price).  Whether we can really identify and then improve welfare by intervening against “currency bubbles” is highly debatable – and it is an area the Bank has already been involved in (by becoming a currency trader )

In a recent post by Arnold Kling I see him hinting at the similarities between his recalculation view of the current recession and the corridor theory of Axel Leijonhufvud.  Now I agree with both these theories, and feel they add an important flavour to current debate – but I think the theories actually tell us about very separate elements of any large scale recession.

In order to get my head around my feelings I’ll have a brief talk about shocks, and the kind of shocks I think are being represented by the different theories.  Feel free to tell me where I am blatantly wrong.

Now, for the non-economist readers I guess this post is a little wonkish in nature – although there will be no maths sitting around this time.

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As speculated by some over the weekend, and confirmed today by the Economist, Copenhagen currently appears to be nothing more than a venue for which policy makers will agree to consider a future agreement on Carbon Emissions.

Undoubtedly there exist links between the U.S.’ relaxed approach to the summit and the Obama administrations efforts to pass universal healthcare; for the latter to pass the support of those contributing to the former is required. This is nothing new. What is interesting to note, however, is that such an attitude to favor health over emissions has been indirectly present within the U.S. for some time.

Earlier this year Boston became the second city (following San Francisco) to pass legislation banning the sale of cigarettes in ‘drug’ stores.  Within this legislation there exists a further directive restricting the sale of cigarettes on college campuses. This is where things become interesting. Consider a representative smoker. The impact upon this agent from said legislation results in further effort (i.e.; distance traveled) to obtain cigarettes. As such, the ‘carbon footprint’ of each cigarette has increased within the city of Boston; not too mention the shadow price of the cigarettes themselves.

The question is now posed; are carbon emissions an indirect consequence of health legislation?