The excel error in Rogoff-Reinhart

I see the Rogoff-Reinhart figures regarding the correlation between GDP growth and the size of the debt stock are currently under attack – due largely to an unfortunate excel error discovered reported by Mike Konczal.  Here are the list of posts about it at the moment:

All very nice.  Depending on the message people were trying to sell they either said the result was meaningless, or central, so I don’t think this makes any actual difference.  Honestly, without clear causal drivers there just were not good evidence based claims for actual policy adjustments – a lot of people were actually just saying we need to do X based on their preconceptions.  And they found this correlation either something that supports that (somehow) or something they need to rule out.

Over the last few years I have seen authors, at different times, use R-R as central to their argument on one thing, and then dismiss it for arguments regarding other issues (I’m not going to name names).  For example, you can’t use this result to say we need more savings policy because the stock of debt is to high, then complain that the study is flawed when you want more government borrowing … just focus on the actual core elements of your frikken argument instead!

My problem with the result isn’t the excel errors, or anything R-R appear to have said – it is the way it has been used as an inconsistent marketing tool by people for selling their own unrelated ideological policies.  I’m just hoping that this shuts that up.

As a side note, here are my feelings on twitter:

People who think the R&R result caused austerity overestimate the impact evidence has on government policy.

Bernanke rules out currency wars

As we said in the title, Ben Bernanke has ruled out that monetary policy in developed nations is akin to a “currency war”:

The lessons for the present are clear. Today most advanced industrial economies remain, to varying extents, in the grip of slow recoveries from the Great Recession. With inflation generally contained, central banks in these countries are providing accommodative monetary policies to support growth. Do these policies constitute competitive devaluations? To the contrary, because monetary policy is accommodative in the great majority of advanced industrial economies, one would not expect large and persistent changes in the configuration of exchange rates among these countries. The benefits of monetary accommodation in the advanced economies are not created in any significant way by changes in exchange rates; they come instead from the support for domestic aggregate demand in each country or region. Moreover, because stronger growth in each economy confers beneficial spillovers to trading partners, these policies are not “beggar-thy-neighbor” but rather are positive-sum, “enrich-thy-neighbor” actions.

I’ve heard this point a few times in the past (here, here, here, here, here, here) … and those are just the links on this blog ;) .  You’ll also note that the third one quotes Bernanke … so hearing him say this is hardly surprising.

Inflation stickiness, demand, and judging the success of monetary policy

I am still a fan of flexible inflation targeting.  I agree with Nick Rowe that explicit inflation targeting has made inflation outcomes “stickier” – and that knowing inflation is in a range of the inflation target is therefore insufficient for telling if the central bank is truly achieving “socially optimal policy”.

For all the time I’ve spent reading monetary economics books and sitting in classes where macroeconomics has been discussed, I still remember a clear (albeit very partial) description of why we do inflation targeting that came in 100 level economics.

I distinctly remember my tutor saying that the point of inflation targeting in the form we use it in New Zealand was to pin down “inflation” (price growth that is shared between all goods and services that is independent of the “relative” value of these goods and services).  With people setting prices based on this view of inflation, central banks with a clear very of the economies “ability to produce” can move around “aggregate demand” in order to prevent recessions that are due to short-falls in demand.  The flipside was often that inflation stickiness was “asymmetric”, with excess demand translating into rising prices, while insufficient demand translated into falling output – this is our good friend the upward sloping, U-shaped, short run AS curve.

This story is massively oversimplified, especially in its treatment of expectations.  But an overarching goal of anchoring inflation expectations was always part of what central banks were aiming to do.  Given this, then in so far an central banks had an idea about economic capacity (which is a very debatable point in itself) they could help to manage “demand” in a macroeconomic sense.  When I was tutoring, this was very much how active monetary policy is taught to first years, and I doubt terribly much has changed.

And this is the point – economists have always know that, if their announcement of a 2% inflation target was the sole determinant of inflation, this does not mean “success” … it just means that they can focus solely more heavily on how the actions of monetary policy have a short-run impact on output.  Deviations of inflation from their target provide information that is useful information about the state of “demand”, but as the NGDP targeting proponents point out it does not capture the whole story.  Variables such as NGDP, and unemployment, provide significant information … something central bankers already recognise and incorporate, contrary to the “narrative” of them being closed minded (Nick isn’t saying this – I’m talking about the more general stories from the media).

This is consistent with flexible inflation targeting – and it does come with one massive hole.  Judging the “success of monetary policy”.  As of course, flexible inflation targeting can only be judged on a forecast, forecasts that are determined by the central banks themselves – and filled with unobservables such as “future economic capacity”.

NGDP targeting differs from this in only three ways:

  1. It changes a partially discretionary rule based process with a fully rule based process.
  2. It targets levels instead of growth rates – making policy “history dependent”.
  3. It gives guidance, and will make “stickier” growth in nominal income – compared to flexible inflation targeting which does this for price growth.

On that final point, at the moment inflation targeting lets a firm say “with competition and the such, I was able to increase my prices 2% this year – this is the same as inflation, and so in reality my “price” is the same”.  With NGDP targeting the firm will say “I increased revenues by 5% this year – this is the same as the growth in nominal spending/value add, as a result my real “revenue” is performing as well as the average firm”.  The right “guidance” will depend strongly on what we think is the most important factor for firms and households to have certainty about (to extract appropriate “market signals”).

To put all this another way – inflation stickiness isn’t an unintended consequence, it is a feature of central banks trying to improve the “sacrifice ratio” associated with active monetary policy!

Menzie Chen on currency wars

You know I don’t believe that the “currency war” is a negative thing in a world of insufficient demand (*,*,*,*,*).  But Menzie Chen from Econbrowser has the same view – and to be absolutely honest their view is significantly more reputable than mine ;) .  Furthermore, it was a point that Chen made all the way back in 2010!

The post I have linked to is excellent, I would suggest reading it the whole way through.

The global economy is not a zero sum game.  The fact that we have significant “output gaps” (unused labour and capital) is the justification for trying to get private agents to “bring forward” consumption and investment now – which is what monetary easing in all its forms does.

In New Zealand, the hard question seems to be “how close are we to filling our output gap” – as if we are close (a popular, even mainstream, view in NZ, that I am not sold on) the current high dollar is indeed indicative of NZ inoculating itself from this global monetary easing.  This is a separate issue again from the “persistently high real exchange rate” that New Zealander’s are concerned about – this is an issue largely unrelated to monetary policy, where as a society we have to start being more honest about the trade-offs from different policy settings we have put in place.

Mark Carney points out the currency war myth

In this piece on Bloomberg, Mark Carney (the govenor of the Bank of Canada, and soon to be governor of the Bank of England) points out that the criticism of the BOJ for the drop in the Yen isn’t fair:

Speaking on the same Davos panel, Bank of Canada Governor Mark Carney commended Japan’s focus on beating deflation. Carney, who will move to the Bank of England in July, said Amari had been “very clear and the Bank of Japan (8301) is clear in terms of the policy focused on a domestic inflation target.”

As long what is going on is consistent with an underlying inflation/NGDP target this is just normal monetary easing, not “beggar they neighbour intervention”.  I noticed that a lot of people keep throwing out this currency war myth, even in NZ, but as we have discussed in a number of posts listed here it is simply a myth.

Truly, if people are concerned about the “plunging Yen” they need to ask why – is it because they have left monetary conditions too tight in their own countries?  If so, that is really just their own fault.  If domestic monetary conditions aren’t too tight we actually have to ask what the issue is – and if there is an issue it will be to do with direct market failure or government policy, it will have nothing to do with rule/expectations based monetary targeting.

Sidenote for New Zealand:  If you are really worried about our “competitiveness” instead of going on about the currency – ask why New Zealanders are so willing, and able, to borrow from overseas.  It is the fundamental drivers of that phenomenon that are inherently related to any lack of competitiveness – the nominal currency is a symptom, a by-product, of the fact that New Zealand consistently invests more than it saves … and tends to not make a sufficient social rate of return on that investment.  To “solve” any perceived problem, we need to actually ask why in this context, rather than arbitrarily attacking things.

The currency “war” myth that won’t die

Over on Rate’s Blog I’ve seen an approving link to an article discussing the “currency wars” that are going on around the world.

As Lars Christensen says here, and as we’ve said on many occassions ourselves given that monetary policy is pegged to an implicit inflation target this isn’t “beggar thy neighbour” policy at all – this is just standard monetary easing.

Now in New Zealand the big complaint is about the exchange rate – many people feel that the New Zealand dollar is “too high”.  However, there are two issues here:

  1. Monetary policy – has NZ monetary policy just been too tight?
  2. Structural policy – are there structural reasons why our exchange rate has been (potentially) persistently over-valued.

We have discussed this before here.

This isn’t a currency war, let me requote something we’ve said before:

Central banks are not breaking the rules, this isn’t a prisoner’s dilemma – competitive devaluations HELP when demand is suppressed … just look at the Great Depression, and the choice of countries to go off the gold standard!

Yes, there likely are structural issues in the New Zealand economy.  But policy makers should be focused on those specifically (why is there insufficient residential building activity, why is the real exchange rate so high) – they cannot be solved by monetary policy or the Reserve Bank.   Even when we think a policy issue is clear we need to be careful, as Noah Smith points out:

It’s important to belabor this last point. Economists know some things, maybe a lot of things, but this is absolutely dwarfed by the size of the things we don’t know and don’t understand. If this blog has had one “unifying theme,” it would be the depth of our ignorance. So when economists urge caution in using policy to change large sectors of the economy, this doesn’t necessarily mean “We know that the free market is always perfect and good and that policy can’t help.”

Instead, caution about policy is very similar to doctors’ maxim of “first, do no harm.” As a doctor, you wouldn’t say “I can’t figure out how this organ is helping the body function, so let’s just take it out.”