The unit of taxation

While having a quick look of “Failbook” I found this enlightening status update:

Source.

This is one of the reasons why taxing on the basis of a “family” unit instead of an “individual” unit doesn’t make sense to me.  By setting up an arbitrary idea of what a family is you ensure that people arrange their affairs to take advantage of that, and you ensure that people that are either unwilling or unable to enter these arrangements struggle.

People pool resources and work together by forming a family unit if they want to.  Lets just stick to taxing people as individuals, and let individuals in society make the decision on what type of family unit to set up given this equal treatment – after all it is the individuals that make choices.

If you are on Facebook …

Support the Freedom to choose, support more choice, support a known cure for hangovers.  Become a fan of the group “Bring KFC Double Down to New Zealand“.

I don’t particularly want a Double Down, I’m not a big fan of cheese and I like to have a bun.  But I do support more choice.

Update:  Do you think it is called Double Down because it has two pieces of chicken, or because persistent consumption is likely to make you double over with a heart attack – I suspect they are rolling with the double meaning …

Another perplexing picture

The Freakonomics blog provides another perplexing picture (the last one was discussed here).  This time we have a situation where it costs LESS to buy two of something then to buy just 1.  So they are PAYING people to take the second unit.  What gives?

The way I see it, there are two likely explanations:

  1. Firms realise that, given buying two units is cheaper than buying one, everyone will buy two units.  However, by pricing a single unit at such a high level they give people the impression that the good is worth more – fundamentally, in this case, the value associated with buying the good is related to its price.
  2. Individuals are time inconsistent.  Realising that one way to prevent themselves being in a situation where they suffer from this inconsistency, they want to limit the amount of the product they buy.  We discussed this with chippies a while back.  If there are two sets of customers that value the good differently, and a time inconsistency problem, this could be a form of PRICE DISCRIMINATION between the two sets of consumers.  In essence we could have one set of customers that values the commitment device strongly, and one that doesn’t!

In both cases we have to assume that there will be no resale – the search cost associated with finding a matching partner for resale is prohibitively high.  However, given this assumption both explanations could work – people could determine there value of a good based on a related price, or it could be a form of discriminating between customers based on how heavily they view buying a small packet as a commitment device.

I prefer the second explanation, as we don’t have to make an additional assumption regarding what people value.  I find the first explanation believable as well.

The main lesson I take from this is, market pricing is a crazy thing that is hard to understand – but it gets the job done.  I doubt that we can effectively try to determine what the right prices are ourselves, when we can’t understand the mechanisms firms use to maximise their profit.  So let the market do its thing, and use the government to solve identifiable market failures and co-ordination problems and redistribute.

I realise this is the lesson I take from everything …

Economic models

From Aaron Schiff:

A model should not be judged solely by its assumptions (although highly dubious assumptions are not a good thing). Rather we should focus on the model’s ability to teach us something, and its ability to explain the economics of something in a plausible way.

To summarise, a model does:

  • Highlight the incentives or tradeoffs that are relevant in a particular economic situation.
  • Generate predictions about the behaviour of economic agents in response to controlled changes in conditions.

I took this from a good post by Aaron Schiff.  I agree with it.

Note that the purpose of economic models isn’t prediction (as we have been discussing) – but we do want a testable hypothesis, in order to make our models scientifically valid.  So the model MUST be testable, but this is not a sufficient condition on models.

Furthermore, predicitive accuracy is not part of testability – as the difference could stem from a change from one of our ceteris paribus (CP) assumptions.

The goal is explanation and description.  And trust me the grey line between prediction and testablility is problematic.  But for the purpose of discussing economic models, the fact that our CP assumptions are the things that break unexpectedly does not invalidate the usefulness or purpose of economic models.

Note:  I will stop writing on this soon and go back to NZ economics.  For me this stuff is interesting, and I like to have a record of where my head is at.

Attacks from the left and the right on economics

One thing I have noticed in my time is that people on the political left and right both attack “mainstream economics” with abandon.  This is good, as a discipline has to be able to explain itself widely and be willing to face criticism.

However, it is one of the elements of these attacks that interests me here.  Namely, how each side of the political spectrum attacks the “focus” of economics, or the framing – specifically in terms of the market and government.  Here is my oversimplified understanding of this element:

  • Left:  Economists are focused on markets.  They start from a place where markets are perfect, and markets provide the best outcomes and work from there – therefore they have a pro-market bias.
  • Right:  Economists focus on markets and resource allocation.  The focus on markets makes them dwell on policies that solve “market failures” rather than paying attention to the possibility of government failures!  As a result they have a bias to push policies that are anti-market.  Furthermore, by discussing the allocation of resources they drive the feeling that the economy can be controlled – which also leads to a bias towards government involvement.

I find both of these attacks suffer from the same problem, they avoid trying to understand why economists use the counter-factual they do, and the way economic analysis stems from it.

In itself, economics is not about giving policy prescriptions, it is about “trying” to “objectively” describe and explain an economic situation.  We find the elements of a market (which is the voluntary trade relevant to the issue at hand), and try to model them.  When then describe a “perfect counterfactual” and look at how these elements cause outcomes to differ.  We then do nothing.

In this case, the purpose of our counterfactual is to give some idea about how a more “realistic” outcome compares to an “ideal” outcome.  We do not say that the ideal outcome is possible, we do not say that any policies could move us towards the ideal outcome, and as strict economists we do not place hefty welfare judgments on the relative outcomes.  The counterfactual is solely there to allow us to describe, in some sense, how the elements in the model impact on the outcome – it helps us to describe.

The next stage is more “subjective” (I am putting commas around objective and subjective as even the “objective” analysis involves a number of subjective assumptions – but I digress), and it is not in the realm of economics per see.  Economists often move on to the policy analysis stage, but it is an additional element, that requires different skills than those that are central to economics.

The biases the left and right discuss tend from their view of the value judgments made by analysts at this stage of analysis – they are not relevant in a discussion about economists.  As a result, although the left and right often like to tarnish all economists with the same brush this is just not the case – economics is not the issues they disagree with here, but the value judgments made in the application of economic models.  The critique is of analysts they do not agree with, not the discipline as a whole.

Of course, I do not expect individuals with a political mind to ever properly accept or represent this significant difference – as there is too much satisfaction and political capital associated with attacking all economists 😀

Data and prediction

Via Scott Sumner we saw the following article that mentions economic data and economic predictions.  The statements that stood out to me were:

(Economic) predictions are, of course, the bread and butter of economic institutions. But can we believe them?

In recent years, some economists have begun to express doubts over predictions made from huge volumes of data, but they are in the minority. Most embrace the idea that more measurements mean better predictive abilities.

Hold up.

For one, as we have mentioned prediction is not the central element of what economists do – and even when they do predict the goal of such prediction is to give some view regarding risks and movements, not direct figures (it is more ordinal than cardinal in some sense).

Secondly, ever since the Lucas critique economists have been very nervous about predictions from large amounts of data without theory – I would say that the majority of economists doubt the usefulness of econometric models relying solely on huge amounts of data.

Economists would like data with less measurement error, that is closer to representing the true economic variables we discuss in theory – we aren’t looking for an infinite number of measures we can stick together to find a result.  An economist that doesn’t use theory to inform their discussions of the economic outlook, but uses lots of data, isn’t an economist – that is all.