The overestimation of Pigovian taxes

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Over at Anti-dismal Paul Walker points at a paper on Pigovian taxes by John VC Nye from George Mason university. In this paper Dr Nye makes the following point:

A claim about the optimal Pigou tax is a joint claim about the size of the externality and about the optimality of observed outcomes, not just the externality. Measuring the size of the observed Pigovian externality – even if done perfectly — is not a reliable guide to the proper level of the Pigovian tax because in a world of efficient transfers we will still observe some externalities

Now this is very true – if we sit in the world of partial equilibrium analysis (which a lot of Pigovian analysis is based on) for too long we can forgot the fact that markets do not act independently, and this is bound to colour our view on the correct level of the Pigovian tax.  At some level this is a critque of Dr Mankiw’s Pigou Club.

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The value of value

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One of the major questions I face when discussing economics is:

Why do we feel that prices are the appropriate measure for illustrating the value someone receives from a product?

Now I only have a limited understanding of welfare economics, but I am going to attempt to discuss the issue anyway ;) . If anyone more knowledgeable would like to correct me I would be happy to hear from them.

In a micro sense this idea could be criticised insofar as one person may have a lower “willingness to pay” for a product which may stem from having a higher opportunity cost (as they have a lower wealth level then other people) rather than truly receiving less value from the consumption of the good/service. If this is the case we may feel that we should re-distribute the resource from the wealth to the poor in order to increase the level of aggregate welfare.

Now accepting this relative ranking of preferences and the given endowment in the market this could be a suboptimal situation in terms of welfare. After all, we know that the poor person values both of these goods more than the wealthy person (assuming no linkages between them) so “total satisfaction” in society will be maximized by this implicit “redistribution” resources. However, this does not make the price mechanism pointless, let me attempt to explain.

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Why might the Fed lift rates?

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There is talk that the US Federal Reserve may begin lifting interest rates again in August.

Now this is something that some commentators find unusual (*) (*). However I think it is consistent for Dr Bernanke to slash rates as he has and then turn around to tighten, given the way he views inflation targeting.

Fundamentally, we have seen two very different reactions to a domestic economic slowdown in Europe and the US. In Europe inflation targeting means sticking to your guns on the annual growth in price measure in the economy – and just looking at other economic variables as a secondary concern.

This view of inflation targeting is justifiable given the inherent commitment game that is required to stabilise growth in the general price level in the economy – however, from a welfare maximising point of view it “may” be too black and white.

In the US, Dr Bernanke is also a proponent of inflation targeting (book and a good speech). I get the impression that he enjoys inflation targeting for its ability to anchor inflation expectations – giving the bank the chance to “deviate” from its mandate temporarily to ease economic conditions.

However, this view of inflation targeting has one major catch – the Bank must stay credible! Continue Reading →

Fiscal responsibility in taxes

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With the actions of the finance minister and the RBNZ both contradicting what I have learned about sound economic management it is time for me to take to task some of the more aggressive issues I have avoided up until now.

Today, my aim is to discuss the (lack) fiscal responsibility associated with Dr Cullen’s nine years in charge of taxes.

Now, there are two ways people have stated that his tax policy is a success:

  1. Through Keynesian economic management,
  2. By increasing progressiveness.

However, if either of these were his goals – the means he has used to achieve them has not be satisfactory. Let me explain.

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Kiwisaver and savings types

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So far we have described that there is some belief that we have some problems in our capital market, this has lead to the statement that we have a “savings problem” and to solve it the government introduced Kiwisaver – which may not even increase national savings (infact it might reduce it). These articles have put us at a point now where we can ask – even if Kiwisaver does not increase national savings, could it do any good.

As mentioned in this post, our “savings problem” may not stem from insufficient savings per see, but from distributional issues surrounding our savings. As Dismal Soyanz suggests, other government policies (or insitutionalised rules of thumb) may have created a situation where savers have a bias towards relatively “unproductive” forms of investment, such as housing – furthermore, households underestimate the risk of certain assets and overestimate the risk of others. These are all behavioural biases that may exist in reality – as a result of the bounded rationality of individuals.

As a result, the purpose of Kiwisaver may be to shift the composition of New Zealand’s savings – not increase the level. Now if this is what Kiwisaver is meant to achieve we have to ask about two things – firstly, is there a better alternative. I can’t think of too many alternatives off the top of my head, so I’m going to cover this by asking, how does Kiwisaver compare to a straight income tax, where some % of the money is put aside?

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