Private sector fails to take on losers …

Interesting series of quotes on the disaster that was think big.

The years of media coverage have not been kind to the “think big” projects of the early 1980s – speculated to have cost taxpayers about $7 billion.

“It’s a peculiarity of New Zealand that both our main parties have been interventionist and it was partly because time and again the private sector failed to provide.”

The private sector failed to ‘provide’ by investing in projects that lost $7bn … that is fair enough in my opinion.  The question is, why did the public sector feel like we should have to throw money down the toilet as taxpayers 😉

I’m being a little facetious here of course.  Rather than evaluating the loss, we need to ask if ‘ex-ante’ – given the risks and the information at the time, and given societies preferences/taste for risk, was this a good idea.

And here we have the kicker – the fact the private sector was unwilling to do it, when they would have to face the risks, suggests that it probably wasn’t a good idea to start with.  Even if think big had “succeeded” it was still bad policy.

Nowadays, I like to think that we base policy on evidence and logical argument – lets hope that actually is the case.

More on commodity booms

After today’s discussion on food prices, it was interesting to see a speech out of the Reserve Bank.

The speech was painting risks – so stating things that could occur that were both positive and negative (risks are not just negative things when your current forecasts “balance” risks).  It was good, it raised issues, and it gave me an idea for a post for next week.

But, who the hell picked the wording on this:

New Zealand farmers are still recovering from the last commodity boom

And I suppose employees are still recovering from the large increase in wages during 2007, and oil drillers are still recovering from the record high oil prices in 2008 …

Yes, farmers overborrowed, sure.  But it wasn’t so much the commodity boom that did it – rather the expectation that land values and high commodity prices would make highly leveraged farm buyouts economical … when some were not.

I imagine farmers are really still recovering from the commodity slump during the GFC, weakened access to credit, and a sharp decline in farm values.  The statement “recovery from” is not the first thing that comes to mind when thinking of a period when incomes were high 😀

… You might think picking up on this is pedantic – but seriously, the wording the Bank uses is analysed in detail.  And statements are constantly compared to try and get a feeling for where policy is moving.  Saying that farmers are recovering from a period of high income gives the impression that they expect farmers to expose themselves again if commodity prices stay high – which is a big call.

I can (and constantly do) mis-speak, because I am not important.  The Bank is important – it sets policy – and the train of thought that is betrayed by their language dictates how the market forms expectations of their policy

Pricey food and New Zealand: Net and distributional issues

I have been crawling closer to writing about food prices for a while.  Originally I was going to only write about distributional issues, but now I’m going to write a little more.

A report released by NZIER yesterday afternoon suggested that New Zealand would be worse off, as a whole, if the relative price of commodities stayed high.  In truth, this result seems like an unlikely counterfactual to me in the current situation (even in the long-term) but the difference would likely stem from some of our implicit assumptions regarding the drivers of higher food prices – and as a result the net income effect and the change in domestic capacity.

However, it is not just people within New Zealand that are concerned, both Matt Yglesias, VoxEU, and the Economist are bemoaning high food prices.  To get an idea of the issues lets split ourselves into three sections:  1) short-term impact of current high food prices, 2) distributional impact of these prices in the short term (this is just for NZ, as it is an important point),  3) long-term impact of high food prices – and what it means if the relative price does stay higher.

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Comic government test

Look at this comic right now, before reading any other comments or anything I have to say.

Via SMBC

Then, if you can be bothered, write in the comments your first impression regarding what this comic implied about government.

Brief comment from me under the fold.

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Saving and consumers: A note

There has been a lot of talk about savings and rebalancing.  I’m not going to touch this stuff in much detail until the Savings Working Group releases their final report.  But in any case, I do need to say a little something now.

I didn’t like the interim report from the savings group (but remain hopefully the final report will provide a more reasonable break down of events when describing any policy conclusions.  And as a result was worried to hear that the government said it would be changing policy on the basis of the interim report.  However, most of the changes they are discussing are more than reasonable – so that is good.

One descriptive factor I have to take issue with though is this:

People borrowed heavily to buy houses and farms, property prices soared and New Zealanders felt wealthier as a result. They spent a lot on consumer goods, which led to a bubble of economic activity.

Really?  I mean, GDP tells us how much stuff we can make – apart from any loss resulting from wasted investment, and changes in relative prices, when we have a certain level of “GDP” we should be able to return to it.  It is production.

And what is this “spent a lot on consumer goods” business.  Let us look at a graph:

Did our spending relative to the amount we could produce seem excessive relative to the last 20 years?

Now, I recognise that the concern could be more long term – we could have been seen to be borrowing too much to consume for 20, 30, 40 years.  But without an actual strong reason why this is the case, and why our creditors have allowed it to persist for so long, I find this difficult.  A country CAN run persist current account deficits, a country CAN hold a large stock of debt as long as it can meet interest repayments.  We can’t say that this is a problem unless we can describe specific institutional factors.

And I haven’t seen anyone do that.  The interim report most definitely didn’t, although I am looking forward to the final report because I am sure it will go into more detail explaining “why” – which is something I would like to know about before commenting on any policy recommendations.

Keeping financial stability and monetary policy together

I have long stated that targets of “financial stability” and “price stability” (monetary policy) were important – but should be performed in separate, yet independent, operational terms (here and here).  Namely, keep the central bank focused on monetary policy while another organisation/operational entity solely focuses on the more long term goal of financial stability.

In my view separation is important for communication – by separating the two people can tell when actions are framed towards certain goals.  By having one organisation/entity trying to attempt both, you risk muddying the waters – which in turn will lead to worse outcomes.

However, this piece at VoxEU makes the opposite case:

Interestingly, empirics tells us that bank risk not only responds to a rate cut, but that it also matters how long rates are kept low (Maddaloni and Peydro forthcoming, Altunbas et al. 2010). This relates to the argument that in the years leading up to the crisis rates were kept low for too long. Our model can provide some reasoning for why this can be damaging. We make the model dynamic and add a crucial feature, maturity mismatch.

In contrast to their short-term liabilities, banks’ assets are long-term. Because of this, banks will only adjust their portfolios if they foresee that a change to their environment is of long duration. A short-rate cut will not push them to take more risk. But a long lasting cut will. A monetary authority that considers financial imbalances therefore has a different timing of policy than an authority that cares only about inflation and output gap stabilisation.

This argument is compelling, and if you have a central bank with only one tool (the cash rate) I think I would be convinced.

However, if central banks are also willing to put in place measures to try and reduce maturity mismatch, and adjust the cyclical nature of banks reserves – then I believe we have multiple instruments.  In this case, the use of each individual instrument should still be directed at a specific target – to make communication clear.

Yes, these instruments are related, and the choice of a financial stability institution will influence the choice of a monetary institution.  But this is already the case with fiscal and monetary policy – and yet we believe we can keep monetary policy independent.

The fact is that the balancing of expectations, and the ability to communicate policy to manage these expectations, is the key part of monetary – and even financial stability – policy.  As this is the case, I continue to find it important to keep these two policy targets operationally separate.

This is an issue I find fascinating, and I’m looking forward to seeing how things develop over the next decade – and why.