Farewell Dr Bollard

Alan Bollard has now pretty much finished his role as governor of the RBNZ following today’s MPS.  He, and the RBNZ, did a great job of helping to steady the NZ economy during the global financial crisis – I think there are few other people in the world who would have felt that sort of pressure before, so it really is quite incredible.  As a result, I’d definitely like to thank him for a job well done during a time that was viciously confusing and extremely important!

Bernard Hickey (*) does the same:

I hope he celebrates his last Monetary Policy Statement news conference and parliamentary select committee appearance. He deserves at least a strong cup of coffee from his favourite café, Daniel’s, next door to the bank at the bottom of the Terrace. That’s because Reserve Bank Governor Alan Bollard can retire on September 25 with his head held high.

He presided over monetary policy and New Zealand’s financial system during the most turbulent period in our economic history since late 1984, when a run on our currency forced a shock devaluation and nearly bankrupted the nation.

Alan Bollard has managed the blunt instrument of the Official Cash Rate (OCR) and the much less simple instruments of banking regulation through New Zealand’s strongest period of economic growth in 50 years and then its deepest and longest recession in 20 years.

Very good.

Debunking Keen on Bernanke: The issue of debt deflation

From Twitter, and email adverts, I’ve heard the Steve Keen is or was in town discussing economics.  That’s good, everyone should be discussing economics.

As you may have noted earlier both Anti-Dismal and myself have had issues with Keen’s analysis in the past – his criticism of microeconomics is just patently wrong.  However, I intend to give him a fair go in his main field of macroeconomics – and will find media of him discussing his work in New Zealand to discuss.

Before I do this though, I have another area where I have to disagree with him strongly – his unfair slandering of Ben Bernanke in these two “essential posts” on his website.

I ran into these posts when I randomly ran into the article on debt deflation on Wikipedia (an article that also unfairly attacks Bernanke – compared to this one).  I was there because I had heard people going on about how we are experiencing debt deflation – something I found strange given that we aren’t experiencing deflation, or the scale of real declines in asset prices, which really are the key feature of a debt deflation episode.

Keen twice quotes the following passage from page 17 of The Macroeconomics of the Great Depression:  A comparative approach (REPEC).

Fisher’ s idea was less influential in academic circles, though, because of the counterargument that debt-deflation represented no more than a redistribution from one group (debtors) to another (creditors). Absent implausibly large differences in marginal spending propensities among the groups, it was suggested, pure redistributions should have no significant macroeconomic effects.

This makes it sound that Bernanke, and the economics discipline as a whole, doesn’t see wholesale declines in asset prices as any sort of significant issue.  Anyone following what central banks have been implementing over the past decade will know this is patently false, but it is worse than that.  He is also quoting Bernanke viciously out of context.

The article actually makes the case for how important this issue is – and then estimates the impact of this type of episode during the Great Depression and finds that it is very very important.  If we go down the page we find:

However, as the HMRC debt management has explained, the debt-deflation idea has recently experienced a revival, which has drawn its inspiration from the burgeoning literature on imperfect information and agency costs in capital markets …

From the agency perspective, a debt-deflation that unexpectedly redistributes wealth away from borrowers is not a macroeconomically neutral event: To the extent that potential borrowers have unique or lower-cost access to particular investment projects or spending opportunities, the loss of borrower net worth effectively cuts off these opportunities from the economy. Thus, for example, a financially distressed
firm may not be able to obtain working capital necessary to expand production, or to fund a project that would be viable under better financial conditions. Similarly, a household whose current nominal income has fallen relative to its debts may be barred from purchasing a new home, even though purchase is justified in a permanent-income sense. By inducing financial distress in borrower firms and households, debt-deflation can have real effects on the economy.

He also then goes on to discuss how it can hit financial stability by knocking out banks.  In the paper he discusses how debt deflation is a major issue, estimates a significant impact, and as an issue it is used to justify the lender of last resort function of a central bank – the very function that the ECB has refused to properly implement, helping to drive the current crisis.

Bernanke also places a link in a footnote to a paper he wrote, describing this very issue (NBR working paper here – and look at the major macroeconomists who helped edit it).

The only reason I can think of why Keen would so blatently misrepresent Bernanke is so that he comes off as smarter and more original than he actually is – that is a very harsh statement I nearly didn’t write, but I find what he’s done here verging on unforgivable … and as readers know, when someone does something like this I tend to get crabby.  If he is going to misquote and insult people, then I’m going to call it like it is. Update:  I’ve changed my mind – that comment by me was unnecessary, and inflamatory.  I should be saying why the misquoting is inappropriate instead of saying such things – my apologises.

Hell, the only reason I picked up on it so quickly was because I’ve recently reread these Bernanke essays when I purchased Essays on the Great Depression for my Kindle – if it wasn’t for that, I probably wouldn’t have even noticed.

But what about debt causing deflation!

This is the true claim to difference – mainstream economists do not say that debt causes deflation, however Keen believes this is the case and quotes Fisher as evidence.

Fisher wasn’t wrong – but he was discussing an economy under the gold standard … so it was an entirely different monetary regime that meant that in the face of this large non-monetary shock, the system created deflation.  Sure enough, we don’t have that sort of system now – and we haven’t seen the mass deflation that we did during the Great Depression.  The monetary regime now is a lot better, and outside of the ECB the lender of last resort function is widely accepted

Perhaps if he gave the writing of monetary policy experts like Bernanke a fairer reading, he may recognise this.

Why macroprudential regulation?

With the RBNZ asking for comments on the upcoming countercyclical capital adequacy  regulation, and the RBA/APRA releasing a report on macroprudential policy now is a good time to ask – why?

I have seen many people justify these types of policies based on “debt being high” – but this doesn’t answer “why”.  I’ve heard a large number of people say it is because government savings made the private sector borrow, leading to financial instability – this not only doesn’t answer why, but it doesn’t involve any sort of sensible role for private agents and so is incoherent.

However, economists aren’t keen to let this issue slide – thank goodness!  The key concern, as previously mentioned, is trying to figure out what the market failure involved is.  What factors drive the systemic risk in the financial sector?  One interesting approach to microfound the incentives through the cycle that lead to this market failure is found here – one I found interesting at least, as there are many more 🙂

Now, it is useful to ask why for a couple of reasons:

  1. We can explain why these policies are actually a good idea – remember, just because something is volatile doesn’t make it bad instead we have to explain why to understand it in this sense.
  2. We can understand the impact of the policies – remember that it is likely that some financial regulation will involve a trade-off between output and stability.  When that is the case, we want to actually decide whether this trade-off is worthwhile.

If we can answer these, we can put in place good policy, policy we can explain, with impacts we can describe, and outcomes we can understand (and hopefully anticipate).

Seperating shocks on financial intermediation

Goldman Sachs has raised an interesting issue regarding the future of financial intermediation following the crisis:

New bank regulations and capital requirements are “structural” changes to the industry that are more to blame for declining profits than the U.S. economic slump, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. (GS) analysts said.

Remember, we have had the failure of Lehman Brothers (the Global Financial Crisis), the sovereign debt issues in Europe (the European debt crisis), and in the NZ context the failure of the non-bank financial sector post-05.  These crises can be expected to have a relatively persistent impact on economic activity – but not permanent.  Once all is said and done, and financial stability is returned, economic activity should in turn recover.

However, if the “wedge” (inefficiency) in financial markets persists indefinitely this suggest that something else is the cause.  Let’s also remember that at the same time that all this was going on financial regulation by central banks around the world has also changed!  While these changes will increase the stability of the financial system – they come with a permanent cost in terms of economic efficiency … there could potentially be a persistent wedge between the return to lenders and the cost to borrowers due to these policies.

Given both happened at the same time we can’t “identify” what did what – which makes the outlook even more unclear than it usually is.  However, it is important to keep all these disparate causes in mind when trying to understand what is going on.

Free food in schools: Equality of opportunity?

Recently the Labour party has suggested we have free food in low decile New Zealand schools.  At the same time, Kiwiblog suggested that this was nonsensical.

So how do we should we view this policy?

Generally, having the government buy something and give then give it out is relatively inefficient – we get no clear signal of the “value” associated with it, and the lack of clear discipline often leads to the government over spending on the service.

However, we could provide this same argument for the provision on “education”, or the provision of healthcare, or the provision of roads.  In each case, we are willing to move away from strict market provision for a reason.

We need to think about primary and secondary school education more clearly to get a good idea about the policy of free lunches.  Why do we provide this sort of education, and what does public provision achieve?  We provide this type of education to ensure there is equality of opportunity for individuals in society.  On that note, having shared lunches at school ensures the same thing – we know that appropriate nutrition at a young age is essential for the physical and mental development of an individual.  We know that, especially in low decile schools, there is a definite “underinvestment” in this attribute for kids.

Now we may feel that it is due to families having insufficient income, and we may say that instead of free lunches a more appropriate solution would be to increase benefits and transfer payments.  But is this the whole explanation?  Potentially the real limiting factor is time, parents do not have the time, or information, to provide their kids with lunches in this case.  If this was the case, then ensuring that the school provides lunch would save these parents the time, ensure that food is provided, and would benefit from “scale” in the provision of lunches. For families that needed help getting food we taught them how to apply for food stamps in louisiana. To be honest, as an individual I have always thought the provision of lunch at school makes sense from an equality of opportunity standpoint – you ship kids off to an institution for most of the day, we may as well make sure that the institution provides the services required.

Personal responsibility is a very important thing, but when it comes to children and education there is only so far such an attitude can take us.  I agree with this Labour party policy for the most part, although I wouldn’t just have it in low decile schools – I would probably make it an option for all schools to spend part of their budget on.

 

PTA’s, currency, and monetary policy

Recently I was sitting at my computer looking at Twitter, when the following popped up in my feed:

NZIER calls for changes to the RBNZ’s Policy Targets Agreement to combat the overvalued NZ dollar – http://bit.ly/Q6aOWX

I found this surprising, as earlier in the day I had read a piece on the NZIER site that I felt was saying something very different to this.  It turned out it was the same article, however it was interpreted in different ways.

Let me state how I took the NZIER piece after several readings.

They stated that, due to the current PTA including several goals, the Bank had not reacted strongly enough to credit growth during the “boom” – essentially, concerns about the exchange rate had prevented them from appropriately responding to what was going on.

As a result of this, if we leave the PTA unchanged, the Bank requires other instruments in order to achieve the “multiple goals” it faces in the current PTA.  Anti-Dismal recently had a post where Don Brash made the same point.

But what about the jazz about the exchange rate at the start

Yes, the article discusses in detail how the NZ currency appears to have been persistently overvalued – and that there has been a chronic imbalance between savings and borrowing.  However, it never lays this down as the Bank’s fault – it merely says that the Bank is facing undue pressure about the exchange rate as a result of this.

As we have discussed a myriad of times, a PERSISTENT IMBALANCE is not the fault of monetary policy – it indicates that the real exchange rate is out of whack in NZ for real economy reasons.  This could be fiscal policy, this could be an issue an issue of competition, this could be an issue of “impatience” by New Zealanders.

Macroprudential regulation can be used to help against these issues in a “financial stability” sense – and the article makes the claim that they can help monetary policy BY reducing policial and social pressure regarding factors monetary policy is uninvolved with.

The article DOES NOT say that we should change the PTA to deal with the currency directly – and if that was actually NZIER’s intention I would be more than happy to have a open, and long, discussion with them regarding why this is the case.